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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

UNCLAS STATE 006306

FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION, ADCMS, PRINCIPAL OFFICERS, AND  
MANAGEMENT OFFICERS FROM UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT  
PATRICK KENNEDY

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [AMGT](#) [AMED](#) [CASC](#) [TBIO](#) [ASEC](#) [KFLU](#) [KSAF](#) [KSEO](#) [KPAO](#)  
SUBJECT: Pandemic Influenza Tripwires

Ref: (A) 08 STATE 67922 (B) 08 STATE 67936

¶1. This is an ACTION REQUEST: please see paragraphs three, four and five.

¶2. The threat of a potentially devastating global influenza pandemic persists. The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza calls pandemic influenza "a unique circumstance," requiring planning beyond more customary emergency readiness.

¶3. Posts are to be commended for their thorough and insightful pandemic planning, and particularly for the tripwires they developed. Medical knowledge about a potential pandemic has increased in the time since the tripwires were developed, and so have some of the recommended responses. The Department has created the following general tripwires for pandemic influenza. Posts should include these new tripwires as part of their current planning as a basic minimum, but posts are also encouraged to incorporate additional, country-specific information in the final version of their pandemic influenza tripwires. This will ensure that posts' tripwires are consistent and reflect current medical knowledge and State Department policy - and also that they give due consideration to specific public health, resource, infrastructure and other factors at play in each country. The guidance and instructions concerning tripwires apply to all USG personnel in country under Chief of Mission authority.

¶4. Posts should provide an introductory paragraph generally describing the host country public health system's current ability to respond to an outbreak of pandemic influenza, the current local availability of antiviral medications to private Americans, whether private Americans are able to receive prescription medications via mail, as well as the host country stance on access by uninsured foreigners to its medical system. Posts are requested to publish their updated tripwires on the Tripwire Reporting and Integrated Planning System (TRIPS) located on the classified network, by February 23, 2009.

¶5. Preface to Tripwires: For easy reference, the following information should be included in the introductory materials to posts' tripwires, or otherwise be easily accessible:

¶A. Unpredictable Nature of Pandemic

How a pandemic would develop (where the first outbreak would occur, how it would spread, etc.) is not predictable at this point. One should not assume that the World Health Organization (WHO) Phases, the Federal Government Response Stages or the tripwires that appear below will occur in a sequential progression during the Pandemic Alert Period or during the Pandemic Period. (For instance, given the ease of international transportation, significant human-to-human transmission may begin in some places without reports of individual clusters of illness.) Therefore, EACs should review all of the tripwires when they initially meet regarding a potentially triggering event. EACs should also be aware that implementation of the actions listed under

each tripwire may vary depending on the severity of the pandemic and the assessment of its risks by medical authorities. In this regard, the Pandemic Severity Index developed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention will serve as a global planning tool for this purpose.

#### 1B. Both Planning and Flexibility are Essential

i. Planning is crucial. As noted in ref B, evacuation should not be expected, and other methods of departure may not be available, making it essential that posts and individuals make prior preparations for remaining overseas during a pandemic. Much of what can be prepared in advance is discussed in reftels and in the first tripwire below.

ii. The most effective response to any emergency, however, requires both good planning and the flexibility to depart from the plan when necessary. Many of the actions discussed in these tripwires will have to be initiated or authorized in the State Department (e.g., "authorized departure" and "ordered departure," as well as other actions, can only be authorized in Washington, D.C.). It is likely that a State Department Task Force would be formed upon USG confirmation that a pandemic had begun. This Task Force would communicate State Department instructions, many of which could differ from what appears in the tripwires below.

iii. In this same vein, tripwires developed in the context of planning for the initial outbreak of a pandemic may need modification for subsequent waves of the outbreak, in order to reflect possible changes in attack rate, changes in the case fatality ratio, the possibility of an effective pandemic-specific vaccine 6 to 12 months after an initial outbreak, as well as other social and economic factors.

#### 1C. WHO Phases and USG Stages

Each tripwire includes the relevant WHO Phase and U.S. Federal Government Response Stage. These pandemic status markers are applied globally; if one country experiences increased and sustained transmission in the general population, which is WHO Phase 6 and Federal Government Response Stage 3, the pandemic is considered to have reached those levels globally. Since tripwires are written from the perspective of the individual post, the WHO Phase or Federal Government Response Stage listed for each tripwire may not seem to correspond to what is happening in the host country. The WHO Phases and Federal Government Response Stages are nevertheless included to put events at post into a global perspective.

#### 1D. Individuals with Special Needs and Those with Disabilities

Posts should include a cross section of individuals at post, including persons with special needs and persons with disabilities (e.g., visual, hearing, speech, mobility) in all aspects of emergency planning, including, but not limited, to overcoming barriers to information exchange and obtaining transportation. Posts should take practicable steps to ensure that all plans, communications, information dissemination, and services, whether via the Internet/Web or through other electronic means (or non-electronically) are accessible to and usable by all stakeholders, including persons with special needs and individuals with disabilities. Here are a few resources on this topic: <http://www.disabilitypreparedness.gov/> (Internet), <http://impact.state.gov> (Intranet), and <http://www.section508.gov> (Intranet).

#### 1E. Accounting for Employee Absenteeism and Limited Access to Facilities

Posts should keep likely employee absenteeism in mind when making plans to maintain essential services, considering probable absenteeism of those who must care for school age children if schools are closed, as well as those who must

stay home due to their own illness or illness of a family member. Possible scenarios include workforce reductions of forty percent for two weeks at the peak of a pandemic, and lower levels for a few weeks on either side of the peak. Posts should also plan for maintaining essential services during periods when access to Embassy facilities and other locations may be limited due to social distancing to limit contagion or due to security concerns. Post should coordinate planning with contractors, suppliers, and shippers, etc., and should also consider the availability of fall-back services, should contracted services not be available as planned.

#### F. Water Storage by Individuals

i. The Department continues to recommend that families store their own supplies of water even though posts are also required to maintain water for their use. At many posts, employee housing may not afford sufficient storage space to permit safe storage of recommended quantities of water (i.e., storing the water without stacking or shelving it in an unsafe manner). As noted under Tripwire One below, families should nevertheless consider storing as much water as is safely allowed by their individual circumstances. Posts are reminded to develop lists of alternate sources of potable water (and equipment, such as distillers), as well as procedures for rendering water safe for drinking, and to develop contingency plans in case expected sources of water are not available.

ii. Store-bought water, from a reliable source and stored in its original, sealed container in a cool, dark place, may be stored until its "use by" date. (Bottled water brands that have been certified by the National Sanitation Foundation (<http://www.nsf.org/>) or by the International Bottled Water Association (<http://www.bottledwater.org/>), or approved for U.S. military purchase, meet EPA Drinking Water Standards (<http://www.epa.gov/safewater/standards.html>) . The NSF and IBWA logos appear on the bottles of approved brands.)

iii. Water prepared for drinking by individuals according to CDC instructions (see <http://emergency.cdc.gov/preparedness/kit/water/>) may be stored up to six months.

iv. For more information about drinking water safety, see the OBO/OM/SHEM website at [http://obo.state.gov/opssaf-shem/PARENT%20PAGES/Policies%20and%20Directives/ALDACs/U.S.Department\\_of\\_State\\_Drinking\\_Water\\_Program.pdf](http://obo.state.gov/opssaf-shem/PARENT%20PAGES/Policies%20and%20Directives/ALDACs/U.S.Department_of_State_Drinking_Water_Program.pdf).

#### G. The No-Double-Standard Policy

In conformance with the No Double Standard policy, information about any action taken by post that makes employees and their family members safer, must be provided at the same time to the general American community as well, to permit its members to take similar precautions. It is not necessary to disseminate publicly information about an EAC meeting or other decision-making group that deliberates about steps that may be taken, but it is necessary to disseminate publicly information about resulting actions that make employees, in general, safer. These actions could include provision of safety and security information to official Americans, limitations on employee travel, or reduction of personnel at post, etc. Many of the actions listed below fall into this category. The consular section administers the No Double Standard policy under the oversight of the Chief of Mission. Any questions about application of the policy should immediately be referred to the Bureau of Consular Affairs' Office of American Citizens Services (CA/OCS/ACS).

#### H. Health and Human Services Teams

Although mention of a possible visit by a HHS/CDC team for the assessment and/or containment of cluster cases first appears in Tripwire Three, posts should be ready to house,

provide transportation for, and otherwise assist such a team at any point.

#### 11. The Status Quo and Tripwire One

Tripwire One reflects the status quo at the time this cable was drafted. Posts should review reftels, which provide information that is still current regarding pandemic policy, to ensure that action items described in those cables have been completed. Note that many of the "Actions to Consider" listed under Tripwire One below are basic steps that should be taken regularly even without a pandemic threat.

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#### 16. Tripwire One:

There are domestic animal outbreaks in various countries, but animal-to-human transmission is rare (Federal Government Response Stage 0, WHO Phase 3). A pandemic outbreak is considered likely at some point in the coming years, and possibly this year or next.

#### 17. Actions to Consider

-- Review USG pandemic policy, as communicated in reftels, at meetings for staff and their families, as well as with the American community via warden messages, newsletters, OSAC discussions and town hall meetings. Points covered should include the following:

a. At the outset of a pandemic, while commercial transportation options are still available, the Department will consider implementing authorized departure for non-emergency employees and any family members at the initially affected post, and will suggest that non-emergency employees and any family members at other posts who do not wish to remain overseas during a pandemic avail themselves of appropriate departure options (SMA, R&R, etc.) in order to return to the U.S. When this announcement is made to employees, the private American community will also be advised, so that its members can make informed decisions about their own actions.

b. Embassy employees, their family members, and private American citizens who do not leave while commercial transportation options are still available (and while borders are still open) should expect to remain in country for the duration of the pandemic. They will therefore need to have prepared in advance for such a situation, having on hand personal supplies of food, water and medications that will last up to twelve weeks. The U.S. Government website, Pandemicflu.gov, contains a checklist of suggested preparations for individuals and families at <http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/individual/checklist.html>. (Note that this website advises families in the United States to keep two weeks of emergency supplies in the event of an influenza pandemic. Given differences in local conditions and preparedness overseas and possible transportation difficulties in a pandemic, the USG recommends that Americans overseas maintain sufficient supplies to maintain themselves in country for up to twelve weeks.)

c. Also see 2008 STATE 67936, which suggests:

Stored food should primarily consist of non-perishable items that do not require refrigeration, or water for preparation, and should include adequate amounts of food for family members on special diets, such as the elderly or infants on formula . . .

Store one gallon of water per person per day (two quarts for drinking and two quarts for food preparation and sanitation) in clean plastic containers (avoiding containers that will decompose or break, such as milk cartons or glass bottles). Also have on hand items

that may be needed for water purification, such as camp stoves and pots . . .

d. It is recommended that families store their own supplies of water. It may be impractical at many posts, however, for individual families to store these amounts of water (see paragraph 5(F) above). All posts should develop a list of potential sources of potable water, procedures (and, if necessary, equipment, such as distillers) for rendering the water safe for drinking, and contingency plans in case these sources of water are not available. An example of a potential source of water is a swimming pool.

e. The Department will consider requesting DOD support for non-combatant evacuation operations only in the event of a breakdown in civil order.

-- Review Embassy supplies of food, water, antivirals, other medications and equipment to ensure that they meet Department pandemic guidelines (see 2008 STATE 67936).

-- Encourage employees and their families to maintain first aid kits at home that include hygiene and medical supplies (see <http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/individual/checklist.html> for a checklist of suggested items). Ensure that this information is shared with the private American community.

-- Review security conditions for employees and their families at their residences and in public venues.

-- Consult with schools attended by American children about safety procedures.

-- Review operations of USG agencies with offices or personnel off-chancery to take into account special security considerations.

-- Review the availability of alternate operating facilities, such as homes or other adequate worksites.

-- Review/test emergency preparations, to include internal/external communication procedures, to ensure these procedures are adequate, that they can be followed to completion by all, including individuals with special needs and persons with disabilities, and that all will have ready access to information during an emergency.

-- Review back-up procedures for advising staff and the private American community during a pandemic about where to obtain up-to-date information about the situation and about Embassy operations.

-- Review/update information regarding exit visas and other formalities for departure.

-- Review/update warden system and F-77 Report.

-- Review volume of controlled/classified documents, and destruction procedures; the Bureau of Diplomatic Security recommends that posts maintain only a "minimum footprint" of controlled and classified holdings, keeping these down to amounts requiring less than one hour destruction time.

-- Ensure personnel lists have been updated on WebPASS Post Personnel System (PS), so that accurate information can be accessed instantly in the Department.

-- Review/update emergency and minimal staffing lists, as well as the status of cross-training for individuals who might have to fill in behind absent colleagues, keeping in mind that absenteeism is projected at up to forty percent at the height of a pandemic wave.

-- Review the adequacy of existing contracts for goods and services as they relate to performance during an emergency such as a pandemic, with an emphasis on whether vital

supplies, such as water, and essential services, such as guard services, are covered.

- Review local healthcare resources, health risk under the current (non-pandemic) conditions, and public health and sanitation situation.

- Perform liaison with host government medical authorities to learn plans for alternate care sites if hospitals are full; confirm that Americans, whether official or private, would be accepted at these sites.

- Perform liaison with host government medical authorities to learn mortuary plans in case of mass fatalities, to include:

- assessments of current capacity for refrigeration of deceased persons.
- discussions of mass fatality plans with local health officials and medical examiners.
- coordination with local health officials to identify temporary morgue sites.
- determination of the scope and volume of supplies (e.g., body bags) needed to handle an increased number of deceased persons.

- Review departure transportation options, and verify commercial air schedules.

- Review post's Internet website to ensure that it is up-to-date and provides detailed information.

- Review whether post's website is part of Department's Content Management System (CMS), which enables 24/7 remote posting of content by the CMS support team at the request of the mission. (Send test messages or requests to embassy-help@getusinfo.com.)

## 18. Tripwire Two:

There is a confirmed outbreak (clusters of human-to-human transmission) in another country (Federal Government Response Stage 2), and human-to-human transmission is increasing there (WHO Phase 4 or 5, depending upon the degree of human-to-human transmission).

## 19. Actions to Consider

- EAC, in consultation with the Operations Center's Crisis Management Staff (S/ES-O/CMS) and, if applicable, the State Department Task Force, confirms that tripwire has been crossed.

- EAC reviews actions listed for Tripwire One.

- Provide Mission briefings for employees and dependents emphasizing procedures in the event that the Under Secretary for Management encourages employees to exercise liberal departure options (SMA, R&R, etc.). Also review health and safety precautions, and social distancing.

- Hold Town Hall and OSAC meetings with the American community to cover information provided to employees during the briefing, and take steps to ensure the information is also sent to the American community via warden message and placed on post's Internet website. Information provided should emphasize that private Americans should strongly consider departing at the earliest stages of a pandemic, while commercial options remain available (and those who do not depart should be prepared to remain in country).

- If the Department issues a revised Travel Alert or Travel Warning, posts should promptly disseminate it to the local American community.

- Update information regarding exit visas and other



formalities for departure.

-- Ensure personnel lists have been updated (including information about TDYers) on WebPASS Post Personnel System (PS), so that accurate information can be accessed instantly in the Department.

-- Review the next tripwire to be ready to react quickly once it is crossed.

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10. Tripwire Three:

A pandemic influenza outbreak with human-to-human transmission in the host country has been confirmed (Federal Government Response Stage 2 or 3, and WHO Phase 5 or 6, depending upon the degree of human-to-human transmission: "significant" or "efficient and sustained").

11. Actions to Consider

-- EAC, in consultation with the Operations Center's Crisis Management Staff (S/ES-O/CMS) and, if applicable, the State Department Task Force, confirms that tripwire has been crossed.

-- EAC reviews actions listed for Tripwires One and Two.

-- Be ready to house, provide transportation for and otherwise assist a USG rapid response team led by HHS/CDC, which may be deployed to the host country for the assessment and/or containment of cluster cases in the event of an incipient pandemic.

-- Consider instituting social distancing policy for employees and their family members, advising them to avoid crowded venues, including representational events. Since large meetings of Embassy personnel are inadvisable at this point, notify personnel of preferred methods of disseminating information (e-mail, Intranet postings, telephone, etc.). Take steps to ensure that information about this action is provided to the American community via warden message and placed on post's Internet website. Urge private Americans to practice social distancing.

-- Disseminate information to personnel about the possibility of host country quarantine and how to cooperate with local authorities. Disseminate information about this action via post's warden system and Internet website, noting that although the Embassy would like to know whenever an American citizen is taken into quarantine facilities, consular employees will generally not be permitted to visit that person or remove them from the facility.

-- Complying within reason with the requirement for "social distancing," set up and staff a control room with a stable electrical supply as well as phone and Internet access.

-- Consider setting up, in compliance with the requirement for "social distancing," a rumor-control hotline staffed by volunteers and at least one representative of post's press office. The volunteers would refer callers to appropriate USG websites, including post's website and PandemicFlu.gov. The press office representative would prepare and obtain clearance for press guidance and coordinate messaging with other USG agencies and local government ministries.

-- Consider advising employees to withdraw children from local schools, and inform the American community of any decision to do so via the warden system and post's Internet website.

-- Consider strongly encouraging use of sick leave for employees who exhibit flu-like symptoms or have family member exhibiting flu-like symptoms. Take steps to ensure that information about this action is provided to the

American community via warden message and placed on post's Internet website. Urge private Americans to take the same precautions.

-- Consider limiting the number of TDY personnel at post. If action adopted, advise American community via post's warden system and Internet website.

-- Consider restricting official and unofficial travel to suspect areas. If action adopted, advise American community via post's warden system and Internet website.

-- Consider restricting in-country travel by all employees, as well as TDY travel by post personnel, and consider recalling employees already located in remote areas. Disseminate information about this action via post's warden system and Internet website.

-- Review host government's emergency mortuary set-up, and ensure that post will be able to assist both official and private Americans coordinate with host government medical authorities when a body must be placed in a mortuary facility.

-- Evaluate and report on capacity of local government to deal with epidemic, restore services and ensure domestic order.

-- Consult with CA about ceasing to provide non-emergency consular services (including visa services and non-emergency ACS services), and, if action adopted, disseminate information about it via post's warden system and Internet website.

-- Consult with CA about limiting face-to-face contact with ACS cases. If action adopted, advise American community via post's warden system and Internet website.

-- Reduce embassy operating hours and services, and disseminate information about this action via post's warden system and Internet website.

-- Update information regarding exit visas and other formalities for departure.

-- Request authorized departure for non-essential employees and any family members. If it is granted, the Department will issue a Travel Warning, and post should disseminate it to the American community via post's warden system and Internet website. The Travel Warning will emphasize that Americans should strongly consider departing while commercial options remain available, and that those who do not depart should be prepared to remain in country. Evacuation should not be expected. (Note: at the point that seats on commercial flights become difficult to obtain, the Embassy may need to assist private Americans in obtaining seats just as it does employees.) Inform host government and other foreign missions of drawdown status.

-- If authorized departure is not granted, provide Mission briefings for employees and dependents emphasizing procedures in the event that the Under Secretary for Management encourages employees to exercise liberal departure options (SMA, R&R, etc.).

-- Update personnel lists on WebPASS Post Personnel System (PS), to include TDY personnel, and keep the Emergency Management System (EMS) module current with departures and destinations.

-- Request an update to the Travel Alert or a Travel Warning to reflect post actions. If the Department issues a revised Travel Alert or Travel Warning, posts should promptly disseminate it to the local American community.

-- Review the next tripwire to be ready to react quickly once it is crossed.



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#### ¶12. Tripwire Four:

The pandemic situation is such that it is difficult to get seats on the few commercial flights still operating (Federal Government Response Stage 3, and WHO Phase 6).

#### ¶13. Actions to Consider

-- EAC, in consultation with the Operations Center's Crisis Management Staff (S/ES-O/CMS) and the State Department Task Force, confirms that tripwire has been crossed.

-- EAC reviews actions listed for Tripwires One, Two and Three.

-- Under post's social distancing policy, meetings are no longer routinely held, so reminders to employees about health precautions, as well as procedures to report an emergency, are disseminated via e-mail, Intranet or telephone. Take steps to ensure the same information is provided to the private American community via warden messages and post's Internet website. Americans should be further advised how to obtain food and medications if they run out.

-- Ensure that controlled/classified documents have been reduced to less than one-hour destruction time.

-- Provide information about host-country alternate care sites (e.g., school gymnasiums, armories, convention centers) to employees and family members. Ensure that this information is provided to the local American community via warden messages and post's Internet website.

-- If the Embassy needs to assist employees in booking seats on commercial flights because bookings are difficult to obtain, the Embassy should assist private Americans in booking seats as well.

-- Update personnel lists on WebPASS Post Personnel System (PS), to include TDY personnel, and keep the Emergency Management System (EMS) module current with departures and destinations.

-- Request an update to the Travel Alert or a Travel Warning to reflect current circumstances and post actions. If the Department issues a revised Travel Alert or Travel Warning, posts should promptly disseminate it to the local American community.

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#### ¶14. Tripwire Five:

The pandemic situation is such that random acts of violence or an increase in threats are occurring (Federal Government Response Stage 3, and WHO Phase 6). (As noted earlier, non-combatant evacuation operations will be considered only in the event of a breakdown in civil order; this tripwire does not describe that situation).

#### ¶15. Actions to Consider

-- EAC, in consultation with the Operations Center's Crisis Management Staff (S/ES-O/CMS) and the State Department Task Force, confirms that tripwire has been crossed.

-- EAC reviews actions listed for Tripwires One, Two, Three and Four.

-- At front office level, meet with government officials and contacts to express concerns and discuss enhancement of security around U.S. facilities.

-- Implement security escort of personnel to and from work.

-- Consolidate housing closer to embassy or alternate

command post.

-- Ensure that social distancing and other health precautions are being observed by mission personnel and family members.

-- Update information regarding exit visas and other formalities for departure.

-- Update American community via the warden system and post's Internet website about general safety precautions taken vis--vis local travel and housing (see above).

-- Update functional designations, as needed, and create a shadow roster to make it clear who is on alert, on call, or on duty, and include back-up personnel. Examples include:

- Senior officers, EAC members, other designees
- Security personnel, including Marine Security Guards (MSGs)
- Telephone operators, communications personnel
- General Services Office personnel such as electricians, plumbers, warehouse personnel, etc.
- Others: i.e., secretaries, drivers, key Locally Engaged Staff, etc.

-- Perform liaison with State Department and appropriate U.S. military command in event civil order breaks down and military-assisted Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) becomes necessary. Brief Department on all other conversations with the military command. Bear in mind that a NEO may not be possible, and post's preparations should take this into account.

-- If not already done, and complying within reason with "social distancing" requirements, set up and staff a 24-hour control room with a stable electrical supply as well as phone and Internet access.

-- Review Tripwire Six to be ready to react quickly to a potentially volatile situation.

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#### 16. Tripwire Six:

The pandemic situation is such that the local government cannot contain civil unrest, much of which is directed against the U.S. Embassy and Americans, who may be perceived as having food, water and medications, and refusing to share same. American homes may be broken into by mobs seeking medications and food, and numbers of Americans may be seeking refuge at the Embassy. (Federal Government Response Stage 3, and WHO Phase 6)

#### 17. Actions to Consider

-- At front office level, call the State Department Operations Center to report on the developing situation. This call should be made as soon as it is determined that Tripwire Six may have been crossed. EAC, in consultation with the Operations Center's Crisis Management Staff (S/ES-O/CMS) and the State Department Task Force, confirms that tripwire has been crossed.

-- EAC reviews actions listed for Tripwires One, Two, Three, Four and Five.

-- Request conference call via State Operations Center with CMS (Crisis Management Support), CA/OCS, and the regional bureau's EX office to discuss requesting ordered departure.

-- Request Ordered Departure status from the Department, and provide post's assessment of the current situation. Include information about potential numbers of private Americans departing, and about transportation availability.

-- If Ordered Departure status is granted, the following

actions will become necessary:

- a. If more transportation is needed than is available, request Department assistance. A/LM is responsible for arranging increases in regularly scheduled flights to post, charters, etc.
- b. If departure will not be possible via regularly-scheduled commercial flights or chartered commercial aircraft, CMS and the regional Bureau will discuss request for DOD assistance. Ambassador should brief the relevant combatant command on the situation at hand.
- c. Depending on departure option(s) selected, identify preferred options for internal movement, staging points, routes, assembly areas, embarkation points, etc. Also, consider transportation, timing, and size of group movements.
- d. If potential transportation includes stopovers at a location where there is a U.S. diplomatic post, include transit post(s) as info addressee on all related cable traffic. Provide guidance to transit post on services required for those departing, such as special medical needs, diapers, etc.
- e. Inform other foreign missions of drawdown status.
- f. Disseminate the Travel Warning (issued by the Department when Ordered Departure is granted) to the American community via post's warden system and Internet website. The communication to the private American community should strongly urge private Americans to review their individual circumstances and consider whether they should relocate to the United States at this point. It should note that those who do not depart should be prepared to remain in country, and that embassy services may soon become unavailable to those who stay. Note that warden system and website updates may also become unavailable, and that Americans who stay should monitor the State Department website, and, specifically, <http://travel.state.gov>.
- g. Consult with M/FLO for services to personnel who depart post.
- h. Request that the Department impose Minimize status.
- i. Ensure the guidelines in 4 FAH-3 H-830 "Emergency Evacuation Fiscal Policy" are followed by all agencies at post.
- j. Contact the regional bureau to replenish post operating funds to sustain post operations, and also contact K Fund Manager, RM/CFO, for special K funds for evacuation related operations and evacuee travel. Charter aircraft will be funded at the Department level.
- k. Confirm travel orders are prepared for departing post personnel. (It is best for post to get all information when employees check in at post.)
- l. Consider actions that must be accomplished in the event all employees depart post and operations are suspended. Be ready to initiate document destruction plan.
- m. Arrange administrative control of residences and personal property of departing U.S. Government personnel.
- n. Designate liaison officers, arranging at high level to ensure acceptance by host government and ensuring communication capability.
- o. Consider disposition of pets. (State Department policy precludes evacuating pets via chartered or military aircraft or ships, and they therefore require alternate accommodations. Working animals, such as guide dogs, are not considered pets and will be accommodated if possible.)

p. Consider assigning officers at the main ports of departure to offer routine consular services, assist in liaison with local authorities, and track private Americans leaving the country via the Consular Task Force application. Assign personnel only after consultation with post's Regional Medical Officer or Foreign Service Health Practitioner in case additional protective measures are advised.

q. Update personnel lists on WebPASS Post Personnel System (PS), making sure that TDY personnel have been included, and that the Emergency Management System module is current in its tracking of travels and destinations. If computers are not functioning, transmit up-to-date staffing pattern to S/ES-O/CMS, CA and post's regional bureau, including breakdown of employees and family members by agency and names of TDY personnel, and indicating who is out of country and their status (TDY, annual leave, home leave, R&R).

-- At the discretion of the Chief of Mission, in coordination with the Department, assistance may be extended to other foreign nationals when humanitarian or U.S. national security interests dictate. Post must obtain prior approval from the Department before offering departure assistance. Points to cover in such local discussions may include:

(1) The U.S. Government will consider assisting third-country nationals (TCNs) and host-country nationals in departure on a case-by-case, space available, and reimbursable basis when doing so serves U.S. interests and the passenger(s) has appropriate travel documents, including a valid visa for entry to the United States.

(2) Priorities of movement and how they will be integrated into departure plans.

(3) Reimbursement for departure assistance to third-country nationals is billed directly from the U.S. Government to the government of the individual (except where the national is a family member of a U.S. citizen in which case the national becomes part of the U.S. citizen's individual promissory note).

(4) Advance travel documentation.

(5) Sharing of personnel assignments, communications and other management considerations for the departure process.

(6) Screening procedures at assembly and embarkation areas.

(7) Responsibilities at safe haven, transit points or final destination.

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¶18. Please direct questions to Robin Morritz in M/PRI at MorritzRX@State.gov or Elias Parra in Crisis Management Staff at SES-O\_CMS@State.gov.

¶19. Minimize considered.

CLINTON